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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES-EUROPEAN COURT
OF JUSTICE -CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND THE ENFORCE-
MENT OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MAT-
TERS-COURT INDEPENDENTLY DEFINES PHRASE "SALE ON IN-
STALMENT CREDIT TERMS" TO LIMIT JURISDICTIONAL ADVAN-
TAGE TO PRIVATE FINAL CONSUMERS
In February 1972, Societ6 Bertrand, a company registered in
France, contracted to purchase a machine tool from Paul Ott KG,
an undertaking registered in the Federal Republic of Germany.
The sale price was to be paid by two bills of exchange which were
payable at intervals of sixty and ninety days.' Bertrand became
partially insolvent' and Ott instituted proceedings against it
before the Landgericht Stuttgart. Bertrand did not appear and
the German court entered a default judgment against it on May 10,
1974.3 Ott then brought an action in France to enforce the German
default judgment. The Tribunal de Grande Instance at Le Mans4
issued an order for enforcement of the judgment' pursuant to
Article 31 of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, which was in ef-
' The price of the machine tool was fixed at DM 74,205 in an invoice of May 26, 1972. A
separate invoice relating to transport and installation was later drawn up in the sum of DM
2,224. Payment was to be made in two equal instalments. Socidt6 Bertrand v. Paul Ott, KG,
[1978] ECR 1431, (Case 150/77, judgment of 21 June 1978), 11978 Transfer Binder] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8497. [Editor's Note: Citations in this Recent Development to EEC
Materials conforms to European conventions rather than to the Uniform System of Citation
usually followed by this publication. The Official Journal is cited "O.J." and European Court
of Justice cases are cited to their publication in the European Court Reports, "ECR."]
' DM 4,915 of the first instalment was not paid, and no payment at all was made on the
second invoice. Id.
' On May 10, 1974, the Landgericht (Regional Court) Stuttgart ordered Bertrand, in its
absence, to pay to Ott, apart from the sum owing of DM 7,139, 10% interest on DM 4,915 as
from October 11, 1972 and on DM 2,224 as from August 21, 1973. The judgment was notified
on June 14, 1974 and thereafter became final, no appeal having been lodged. Id. at 1433.
'"The application (for the enforcement of a judgment) shall be submitted: ... in France,
to the presiding judge of the 'Tribunal de Grande Instance," Convention on Jurisdiction
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, September 27,1968, 21 O.J.
1978, No. L 304, 41, at Art. 32. [hereinafter cited as Convention]. The Convention entered
into force February 2, 1973.
' The judgment was declared to be enforceable in France, first by order of June 30, 1975
of the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Le Mans, and subsequently by a confirmatory judg-
ment of the Cour d'Appeal, Angers, of May 20, 1976 which stated in particular "It is a matter
of principle that a sale against deferred payments amount to a cash sale." [19781 ECR 1431,
at 1433.
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. [Vol. 10:2
fect among the six original Member States of the European
Economic Community.6 Bertrand appealed that order to the
French Cour de Cassation on these grounds: that a sale in which the
price must be paid by two bills of exchange constitutes a credit
sale;7 that it is mandatory for an action against a credit buyer to
be brought before the courts of the State in which the buyer is
domiciled;8 and that a decision of a foreign court which has not
complied with this binding rule on jurisdiction cannot be made en-
forceable in France.9 The Cour de Cassation ° found that the solu-
tion to the problem thus posed depended on the classification of
the contract either as cash sale or sale on instalment credit terms,
and asked the Court of Justice of the European Communities to
give an interpretive ruling concerning Articles 13, 14 and 28 of the
Convention." The question presented to the Court of Justice was
whether the sale of a machine which one company agrees to
make to another company on the basis of a price to be paid by
way of two equal bills of exchange payable at 60 and 90 days can
be held to be a sale of goods on instalment credit terms within
the meaning of Article 13 of the Brussels Convention.12
On referral to the Court of Justice, held, the concept of the sale of
goods on instalment credit terms, within the meaning of Article 13
of the Convention, does not extend to the sale of a machine which
' "A judgment given in a contracting state and enforceable in that state shall be enforced'
in another contracting state when, on the application of any interested party, the order for
its enforcement has been issued there." Convention, supra note 4, at Art. 31.
' "In matters relating to the sale of goods on instalment credit terms, or to loans ex-
pressly made to finance the sale of goods and repayable by instalments, jurisdiction shall be
determined by this Section, without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 4 and 5(5)." Id.
at Art. 13.
' "Proceedings may be brought by a seller against a buyer or by a lender against a bor-
rower only in the courts of the state in which the defendant is domiciled." Id. at Art. 14,
para. II.
"Moreover, a judgment shall not be recognized if it conflicts with the provisions of Sec-
tions 3, 4 or 5 of the Title II." Id. at Art. 28, para. 1.
0 "The following courts may request the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings on
questions of interpretation: ... in France, la Cour de Cassation and Le Conseil d'Etat." Pro-
tocol concerning the Interpretation of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Judgments, June 3, 1971, O.J. 1978, No. L 304, 51, at Art. 2 [hereinafter cited as Protocol].
"1. Where a question of interpretation of the Convention or of one of the other in-
struments referred to in Article 1 is raised in a case pending before one of the courts listed
in Article 2(1), that court shall, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to
enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon." Id. at
Art. 3.
For simplicity, the British spelling "instalment" will be used in this Recent Develop-
ment, in conformity with the official English translation of the case.
[1978] ECR 1431, at 1433.
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one company makes to another on the basis of a price to be paid
by bills of exchange spread over a period of time. Socidtd Ber-
trand v. Paul Ott KG, [1978] ECR 1431, (Case 150/77, judgment
of 27 June 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8497.
In 1957, the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic
Community 3 with the ultimate goal of creating a unified commer-
cial market free from national barriers. As a step towards the at-
tainment of this goal, the Member States negotiated the Conven-
tion on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters 14 and provided in the Protocol,"5 which
was subsequently annexed to the Convention, that questions
relating to the interpretation of the Convention would be referred
to the Court of Justice of the European Communities."6 This provi-
sion was added to guarantee that the Convention would be inter-
preted in the same way throughout the Community. 7 Referral to
the Court of Justice enables it to interpret and apply Community
law uniformly, thereby creating an independent and consistent
body of Community law. This objective of uniform interpretation
is central not only to the Convention but also to the Treaty of
Rome, where the guiding intention is for all of the parts to com-
bine into a greater whole through unification and cooperation.18
The evolution of this question of interpretation is illustrated by
three cases which involved the interpretation of the Convention
and which were referred to the Court of Justice of the European
Communities under the Protocol of the Convention." In Industrie
Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG,2" the first case involving in-
terpretation of the Convention under the Protocol,2' the Court was
,3 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome].
' Convention, supra note 4.
,5 Protocol, supra note 10.
6 "1. Where a question of interpretation of the Convention ... is raised in a case
pending before one of the courts listed in Article 2(1), that court shall, if it con-
siders that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment,
request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon."
Protocol, supra note 10, at Art. 3.
* Jenard Report, O.J. 1979, No. C 59.
*S Treaty of Rome, supra note 13.
* The Protocol to the Convention provides for referral to the Court of Justice. See note
10 supra.
" Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG, [1976] ECR 1473, (Case 12/76, judgment
of 6 October 1976), [1976 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8375.
"' Id. at 1487.
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called upon to interpret the expression "place of performance"22 as
it related to a controversy between an Italian manufacturer of ski
wear and a German purchaser. Tessili argued that the phrase
should be given a uniform interpretation based on the Convention
and on Community law, in order to achieve the goal of uniformity
articulated by the drafters of both the Convention and the Treaty
of Rome. 23 The Court, however, adopted a rather conservative
position and ruled that although the Convention should be inter-
preted with regard to its own principles and those of the Rome
Treaty, 4 the "place of performance" must be determined in ac-
cordance with the law which governs the obligation in question ac-
cording to the conflict of laws rules of the particular court before
which the matter is brought. 25 In his opinion, Mr. Advocate-
General Mayras said that the aim of the Convention was to deter-
mine which court in a given State had jurisdiction over a question.
He felt that it would be difficult to go any further on the uniform
interpretation of concepts as long as there was no applicable body
of substantive Community law." The Court followed the opinion of
the Advocate General, choosing the traditional rules of conflict of
laws over an independent, untested and possibly unauthorized in-
terpretation of an expression contained in the Convention.
This conservative approach to the question of interpretation
was abandoned by the Court in its disposition of a subsequent
case. In LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v.
Eurocontrol,' the Court was requested to give an interpretation
22 Id.
21 "[Tihe objective of the Convention . . . is to lay down uniform rules on jurisdiction-
applicable to the settlement by courts of disputes arising from these relations and likely to
guarantee that in the future similar situations will be dealt with in the same way." Id. at
1476.
24 "[Tlhe Convention must be interpreted having regard both to its principles and objec-
tives and to its relationship with the Treaty." Id. at 1484.
21 [Tihe question therefore arises whether these words and concepts must be regarded
as having their own independent meaning and as being thus common to all the
Member States or as referring to substantive rules of the law applicable in each
case under the rules of conflict of laws of the court before which the Matter is
first brought. Neither of these two options rules out the other since the appropriate
choice can only be made in respect of each of the provisions of the Convention
to ensure that it is fully effective having regard to the objectives of article 220 of
the Treaty. In any event it should be stressed that the interpretation of the said
words and concepts for the purpose of the Convention does not prejudge the
question of the substantive rule applicable to the particular case.
Id at 1484.
26 Id at 1494.
22 LTU Lufttransportunterhehmen GmbH & Co. KG v. Eurocontrol, [1976] ECR 1541,
(Case 1, judgment of 24 October 1976), [1976 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8377. For a thorough report on this case, see also 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 553 (1977).
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of the expression "civil and commercial matters."28 In this case,
the Court indicated a strong preference for uniformity when it ruled
that, in matters of interpretation, reference must not be made to
the law of one of the states. Instead, the Court should refer first
to the objectives and schemes of the Convention and second to the
general principles of all of the Member States' national legal sys-
tems." The Court said that because the Convention applies in civil
and commercial matters, regardless of the nature of the court or
tribunal where a case is brought, it is not possible to base an inter-
pretation solely on the principles of one jurisdiction." After ruling
that the objectives of the Convention required an independent
definition of the phrase "civil and commercial matters," the Court
held that the conflict between the parties, one a legal person
governed by private law and the other a public authority exercis-
ing its public powers, was excluded from the area of application of
the Convention." The Court wanted to expand the recognition of
foreign judgments and at the same time avoid multiple interpreta-
tions of Community law which might hamper the effectiveness of
the Convention. The adoption of an independent concept in this
case allowed the Court to deny jurisdiction without diminishing
the scope of reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments
within the Community.2
The next case to request the interpretation of an expression
contained in the Convention was Industrial Diamond Supplies v.
Luigi Riva 3 The question put to the Court concerned the proper
interpretation of the expression "ordinary appeal." Because of the
differences in the legal concepts of the Member States with re-
gard to the distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary"
appeals, it was impractical to try to determine the meaning of this
concept by referring to the national legal systems of the States in-
volved in the controversy. 3' To reduce the uncertainty which
would result from reference to various national legal systems, the
[1976] ECR 1541.
"In the interpretation of the concept 'civil and commercial matters' for the purposes of
application of the Convention ... reference must not be made to the law of one of the states
concerned but, first, to the objectives and schemes of the Convention and secondly, to the
general principles which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems." [1976] ECR
1541, at 1552.
U [1976] ECR 1541, at 1550-51.
[1976] ECR 1541, at 1552.
See 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 553, 564 (1977).
3 Industrial Diamond Supplies v. Luigi Riva, [1977] ECR 2175, (Case 43/77, judgment of
22 November 1977), [1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8453.
31 [1977] ECR 2175, at 2188.
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Court decided to determine the meaning of the phrase within the
framework of the Convention itself and not according to the laws
of the State where the judgment was rendered or the State where
enforcement was sought." The Court ruled that the expression
must be given an independent meaning and then went on to define
an "ordinary appeal."3 This decision is significant because the
Court, with little hesitation, defined a concept for the future refer-
ence of the Community and in so doing virtually created substan-
tive Community law. Significantly, the Court relied on the Con-
vention, which was intended originally only as a tool to promote
"full faith and credit" among the Member States of the EEC.
In the present case, Paul Ott KG brought an action for enforce-
ment of the German judgment in the French courts in accordance
with the provisions of the Convention. 7 It was able to do this as a
result of the evolution of Community law from 1957 to the pre-
sent. Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome encouraged negotiations
among the Member States on issues which would promote unity
and equal protection regardless of nationality. 8 The Convention
was drafted in direct response to Article 220, providing uniform
and concise guidelines for reciprocal recognition and enforcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters. 9 The 1971 Protocol
annexed to the Convention provides that referral be made to the
Court of Justice when questions of interpretation of the Conven-
tion arise." This was the groundwork which enabled the Court of
Justice to accept the request from the French Cour de Cassation
119771 ECR 2175, at 2191-92.
119771 ECR 2175, at 2192.
3 Convention, supra note 4.
The original six Member States (Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands) were parties to the Convention at the time the present. case was brought
before the Court. Upon the accession of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland, the
Convention was renegotiated and amended. This amended treaty was signed by the nine
Member States on October 9, 1978. Although the amended convention was not in effect
when this case was brought before the Court, negotiations were near conclusion. For the
text of the Convention of Accession of October 9, 1978 of the Kingdom of Denmark, of
Ireland and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Conven-
tion on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice, see O.J. 1978, No. L 304.
[hereinafter cited as Convention of Accession).
" "Member States shall, insofar as necessary, engage in negotiations with each other
with a view to ensuring for the benefit of their nationals .... the simplification of the for-
malities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or
tribunals and of arbitration awards." Treaty of Rome, supra note 13, at Article 220.
" "This Convention shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of
the court or tribunal." Convention, supra note 4, at Article 1. See also 119761 ECR 1541.
"o Protocol, supra note 10, at Art. 3(1).
[Vol. 10:2
RECENT DEVELOPMENT
for an interpretive ruling on the meaning of the phrase "sale on in-
stalment credit terms" when it arose in the case of Bertrand v.
Ott.
In addition to briefs for Paul Ott KG and Soci6t6 Bertrand, the
Court received written observations from the German and Italian
governments and from the Commission of the European Communi-
ties." The government of the United Kingdom also submitted its
observations to the Court." These comments focused on the cri-
teria to be adopted by the Court for interpreting sale of goods on
instalment credit terms. At issue was whether the phrase "sale on
instalment credit terms" should be interpreted according to the
international principle of lex fori or should be given an independ-
ent meaning under the Convention.
Realizing that referral to the Court of Justice provided a final
chance to escape the German judgment, Bertrand maintained that
its contract with Ott should be characterized as a sale of goods on
instalment credit terms. The courts at Le Mans and Angers had
classified the contract as a cash sale43 and Bertrand had appealed
the order of exequatur." The Cour de Cassation found that the
classification of the contract as a cash or credit sale was essential
to the solution of the problem and referred this question to the
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. Bertrand contended that
the Court of Justice should adopt an independent meaning of the
concept rather than define it on the basis of lex fori. Not only the
protective legislation, but even the very concept of sale of goods
on instalment credit terms varies from one Member State to the
next. To avoid contradictory interpretation, Bertrand argued, a
single Community classification should be superimposed on the
various national rules without reference to any particular protec-
" "lT~he parties, the Member States, the Commission and, where appropriate, the Coun-
cil, shall be entitled to submit statements of case or written observations to the Court."
Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Economic Community,
April 17, 1957, at Art. 20.
" Even though the Convention as amended by the Convention of Accession has not yet
entered into force for the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, the government of the
United Kingdom was nonetheless entitled to submit a written observation to the Court
under the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Economic Com-
munity, Art. 20.
" "[Al judgment shall not be recognized if it conflicts with the provisions of Section 3, 4
or 5 of Title II. ... Convention, supra note 4, at Art. 28.
" [19781 ECR 1431. The Court in which the action for enforcement was brought was en-
titled to review the subject matter of the German decision so far as it concerned the
classification of the contract. See also 119761 ECR 1541, where it was accepted that the
court applied to may review the classification of the subject-matter dealt with by the court
of first instance.
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tive legislation. Thus, it concluded, a sale on instalment credit
terms, construed within the meaning of Article 13 of the Conven-
tion, can only be a credit sale in which the price is paid by successive
amounts. This would make the German judgment unenforceable in
France; the German court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because it failed to comply with the compulsory rule expressed in
Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Convention.4 5
Ott agreed that if there is no uniform concept of sale on instal-
ment credit terms common to all member states, the primary ob-
jective of the Convention, namely, the free movement of judg-
ments, would be hindered. It argued, however, that the public
policy objective of Section 4 of the Convention is the protection of
a certain class of buyers and it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween the private final consumer and the professional or trade
purchaser. Since post-Convention national laws regarding sales on
instalment credit terms were oriented toward protection of the
consumer, it would be logical to conclude that the drafters of the
Convention had the same objective in mind. It would defeat the
purpose of Article 14 of the Convention to accord the jurisdic-
tional advantage indiscriminately to professional and non-
professional buyers. Ott argued that the Court should declare a
uniform Community concept of a sale on instalment credit terms,
restrict application of Article 14 to non-professional buyers, and
declare the contract with Bertrand not to be a sale on instalment
credit terms within the meaning of Article 14 of the Convention."
The Commission of the European Communities also argued that
an independent concept based on general principles of the national
rules should be established. The question presented by this case,
the Commission contended, is whether the arrangement for pay-
ment in this contract constituted a sale on instalment credit terms
or was merely an example of the common trade practice of a
credit sale. The Commission observed that in many national laws
the criteria for classification of a contract are the status of the
buyer (professional or non-professional), whether or not the laws
set maximum price limits and whether the payment agreement
permits a simple deferred payment (a common trade practice) or
provides an elaborate financing agreement with a deposit, interest
and time limits. In the oral proceedings, the Commission argued
that while traders should not be excluded systematically from the
-5 [1978] ECR 1431, at 1433-35. See note 8, supra.
4[1978] ECR 1431, at 1435-39.
[Vol. 10:2
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protection provided by the Convention, contracts concerning in-
dustrial machines or concluded by industrial companies should be
excluded. The Commission also mentioned the proposed amend-
ments to the Convention47 which would limit the application of the
Section 4 jurisdictional advantage to contracts entered into by
persons for purposes which may be considered extraneous to their
professional or trade activities, those persons being designated
"consumers." 48
The government of the United Kingdom observed that the func-
tion of Article 13 in the Convention is to reserve protection to con-
sumers: those buyers not engaged in commercial activities. It
argued that the true test of whether a contract should be classi-
fied as a sale on instalment credit terms is in the relationship of
the parties, the buyer being generally in a weaker economic posi-
tion than the seller.49
The German government commented that under German law,
rules relating to sales on instalment credit terms had credit policy
objectives as well as those of consumer protection. These laws are
not applicable to any trader whose name appears on a commercial
register. The German government observed that there is,
however, no indication in the Convention that professionals were
to be excluded from Article 13: it believed that the grounds for ap-
plication should be whether or not the buyer is in need of protec-
tion. This is difficult to determine merely on the basis of profes-
sional or non-professional standing. It agreed that an independent
concept was called for but argued that the contract in question
should be classified as a sale on instalment credit terms within the
meaning of Article 13.50
The Italian government agreed that the concept must be given
an independent meaning because the Convention itself is derived
not from any national laws but from Community law.' It also
agreed that the objective of Section 4 is the protection of an eco-
nomically weaker contracting party, but argued that a sale on in-
stalment credit terms should be defined purely on the basis of a
payment arrangement providing for payment after delivery.52
Advocate General Capotorti believed that the Convention and
the case law indicated the adoption of a uniform Community con-
C' convention of Accession, supra note 37.
Id. See. [1978] ECR 1431, at 1439-40, 42.
49 (1978] ECR 1431, at 1440-41..
[1978] ECR 1431, at 1441-42.
" Treaty of Rome, supra note 13, at Art. 221.
52 [19781 ECR 1431, at 1442.
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cept of sale on instalment credit terms. Reference to national law
is to be made only when no independent meaning of a concept can
be found in the Convention. Article 14 presents an exception to
the general rule of jurisdiction set out in Article 2. Because Arti-
cle 14 represents a derogation from the general rule it must be in-
terpreted restrictively. The Advocate General approved of the
remarks made by the government of the United Kingdom in re-
stricting application of Article 14 to consumers and suggested
that the concept be defined as a sale by a commercial undertaking
to a consumer with payments spread over a period of time. He fur-
ther commented on the proposed amendments to the Convention
which would restrict application of Section 4 to contracts which
are concluded by a person for a purpose which can be regarded as
being outside of his trade or profession. 3 In conclusion, he remark-
ed that the solution he suggested coincided with the foreseeable
course of development of the Convention. 4
The Court of Justice agreed with all parties and observed that
it was necessary to adopt an independent and common definition
of the concept of sale on instalment credit terms.5 It observed
that the harmonious operation of Article 13 et seq. of the Conven-
tion could not be guaranteed if this concept were to be given dif-
ferent meanings in the different Member States. The Court stated
that the compulsory jurisdiction provided for in the second para-
graph of Article 14 must be strictly limited to the objectives
proper to Section 4 because it derogates from the general prin-
ciples laid down by the Convention. Those objectives were in-
spired solely by a desire to protect certain categories of buyers
who are in need of protection due to the fact that their economic
position is one of relative weakness compared to that of the seller.
The Court followed the rationales suggested by the United King-
dom and the Advocate General and reasoned that a restrictive in-
terpretation of the second paragraph of Article 14 entailed the
limitation of the jurisdictional advantage to only those buyers who
are private, final consumers and who are not engaged, when buy-
ing on instalment credit terms, in trade or professional activiti-
ties.
Having established the criteria of uniform and independent in-
terpretation of the Convention, the Court then could determine
C' onvention of Accession, supra note 37.
[19781 ECR 1431, at 1452.
[19781 ECR 1431, at 1445, para. 14.
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the objectives of Section 4 contemplated by the drafters without
the possibility of contradiction by any national legal source. It con-
cluded that the concept of the sale of goods on instalment credit
terms within the meaning of the Convention could not extend to
the sale of a machine which one company makes to another, re-
gardless of the arrangement to discharge the purchase price by
way of payments spread over a period of time."
In reaching this decision, the Court was following the analytical
precedents which had been set down in the Tessili, LTU and Riva
cases. These decisions reflect the Court's assessment of the evolu-
tion of Community law, from different and often contradictory na-
tional rules toward an integrated Community scheme. When the
Convention was drafted in 1968, the notion of consumer protection
was not of great concern to the Member States individually. Only
one, Belgium, had enacted any legislation to protect an economic-
ally weak buyer from an unfairly worded contract.57 The Conven-
tion, therefore, dealt with this topic within the limited context of
instalment sales and loans, since this was the only field where an
awareness of the need to protect a weaker party was present.
Since 1968, however, the Member States have become far more
concerned with consumer protection. Legislation adopted for the
general purpose of protecting the consumer is presently in force
in all the Member States. 9 It was likely that tension would
develop between the Member States and the Convention if the
Convention did not provide at least as much protection to the con-
sumer in a transfrontier contract as he could expect to receive
under his national rules." Consequently, the Court in Bertrand
adopted an independent interpretation of the phrase "sale of
goods on instalment credit terms" in order to protect the private
final consumer to the same extent that the laws of the Member
States did and to guarantee the restriction of the jurisdictional ad-
vantage to only those buyers in need of protection.
In his report to the Commission of October 9, 1978, on the acces-
sion of the three new Member States to the Convention," Professor
Dr. Peter Schlosser wrote that the working party on the Conven-
tion of Accession had made proposals which would expand Section
[1978] ECR 1431, at 1447.
" [1978] ECR 1431, at 1437.
Schlosser Report, O.J. 1979, No. C 59, 117.
[1978] ECR 1431, at 1450.
o Schlosser Report, supra note 58.
81 See note 37, supra.
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4 of the 1968 Convention to provide jurisdiction over consumer
contracts, limiting the applicability of that section to private, final
consumers and establishing, for future purposes, that only final
consumers acting in a private capacity and not in the normal
course of business should be given special protection."2 He further
stated that the Working Party had been influenced on this point
by the proceedings in the Court of Justice of the Bertrand case. 3
The revised Convention offers a legal definition of the word "con-
sumer"6 4 and Section 4 is retitled "Jurisdiction Over Consumer
Contracts."65
If the Tessili question were to be put to the Court today, there
is a good chance that the Court would give a Community defini-
tion to the expression "place of performance" rather than return
the question to the national courts and their traditional rules of
conflict of laws. It is unlikely that the Court in the future will
allow national law to prevail where the possibility of achieving
further integration through the fabrication of a Community con-
cept exists. The present climate of the Community is very
favorable to integration and uniformity. In addition to the Conven-
tion on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments, conven-
tions are being negotiated between the Member States to bring
uniformity into the fields of contractual and non-contractual
obligations 6 and a proposal for a European corporate charter is
being studied,67 to mention only two areas where work leading to
further unification is being conducted presently.
Greater uniformity of the substantive law within the EEC
means that there will be more power vested in the supra-national
bodies than perhaps was contemplated by the drafters of the
Treaty of Rome in 1957. Although we are far from being able to
predict the ultimate consequences of this trend, we cannot dispute
its presence. The Court's decision in Bertrand seems to indicate
that in the future there will be little, if any, resistance to its adop-
tion of uniform and independent Community definitions when
62 Schlosser Report, supra note 58.
63 Id.
64 "In proceedings concerning a contract concluded by a person for a purpose which can
be regarded as being outside his trade or profession, hereinafter called 'the consumer'...
Convention of Accession, supra note 37, at Art. 13.
65 Id.
6 Preliminary Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual and Non-Contrac-
tual Obligations. [1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 6311.
67 1975 Proposal to the European Economic Communities for a Statute for the European
Company, 8 BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES Supp. No. 4 (1975).
[Vol. 10:2
1980] RECENT DEVELOPMENT 461
called upon to interpret concepts from conventions or agreements
between the Member States. Perhaps this decision can be viewed
as an example of the Court exercising its increasing power as a
unifier of the Community and a creator of the growing body of
Community law.
Elizabeth Grant Kline

